Sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by …ltering out economic cycles (which they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we …nd that the incumbent vote share a) responds di¤erently to trend growth than to the cycle, b) does not respond signi…cantly to positive variation in the economic cycle, and c) responds signi…cantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the 'grievance asymmetry'this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth.
In a recent survey of the literature on how election results are linked to economic performance Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (forthcoming) rea¢ rmed Nannestad and Paldam's (1994) …nding that the economic vote is "almost always... strong... and statistically signi…cant."
Voters reward incumbents that deliver strong growth, and punish those that do not. However, despite over 40 years of research, the underlying mechanisms are still not very well understood. Are voters rationally rewarding competence? Or are they naively responding to unsustainable pre-electoral booms?
The contribution of this paper is to decompose economic performance into constituent measures of trend growth and the economic cycle. Empirical work to date examining voting responses to GDP growth has focussed exclusively on measures reported in raw terms. This is surprising, and we argue mistaken, because separation of the economic cycle and underlying economic growth, and their respective drivers, is central to much of modern macroeconomic thinking. Furthermore it seems plausible that voter-welfare would be di¤erently a¤ected by sustainable trend growth and unsustainable booms. 1
In short-run models of the macroeconomy, the volatility embedded in the economic cycle reduces welfare. 2 Indeed, upswings in the economy -positive values of the 'output gap'as sometimes de…ned, are typically modeled to generate as much disutility as downswingsnegative values of the output gap. Therefore policymakers are almost always modeled to have quadratic disutility in the output gap (e.g. see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) . 3 In the 1 Note also that the duration of economic and electoral cycles are of the same order of magnitude. For the US Burns and Mitchell (1946) found that business cycle duration ranged from 6 to 34 quarters and more recently the National Bureau of Economic Research registered 7 postwar business cycles with a minimum duration of 6 quarters and a maximum of 43 quarters. (See Everts (2006) for an examination of these numbers.) These duration statistics compare with electoral cycles usually varying between 3 and 5 years.
2 One (very plausible) element of this argument is that individuals cannot fully insure themselves against the vagaries of the economic cycle, and in particular the possibility of unemployment.
3 Quadratic utility is not just a mathematical convenience - Woodford (2003) derives it as a second-order context of this paper this means that any unnecessary volatility -downswings and upswings, when perceived to be the fault of the incumbent, would under rational voting be punished at the ballot. A related criticism is leveled by Alesina and Roubini (1992) against early versions (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975) of the 'political business cycle'. Rational voters should ignore (if not punish) opportunistically engineered pre-electoral booms as they will be recognized to be unsustainable (see also Alesina et al, 1999) .
On the other hand ‡uctuations may stem from external shocks such as oil price shocks, global …nancial shocks such as the recent and ongoing credit crunch, or indeed "irrational exuberance" in the good times. These are plausibly outside of the control of policymakers. 4
But even here, informed rational voters might still hold the government responsible for its handling of the cycle. Overall it seems plausible in most instances that the rational voter would, to some degree at least, hold the incumbent to account, negatively, for ‡uctuations in the economic cycle.
In contrast, within economics at least, it is close to axiomatic that long-run (trend) economic growth increases welfare, all else equal. Moreover the idea that cross country di¤erences in income per capita are partly driven by government policy is central to the literature on economic growth. For example Hall and Jones (1999) argue for the fundamental importance of 'social infrastructure'de…ned explicitly as "the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and …rms accumulate capital and produce output". Empirically Rodrik et al (2004) …nd that approximation to the utility function (which can take very general form) of a representative agent. In the New Keynesian literature both upswings and downswings generate unnecessary dispersion in the distribution of prices in the economy, given some degree of price rigidity, which changes consumption patterns and is detrimental to welfare. 4 Incumbent 'responsibility'also undoubtedly di¤ers across institutions and countries. Important advances here include Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten and Palmer (1999). institutional quality "trumps" other potential determinants of cross-country income levels.
Given the wide dispersion in economic performance it is clear that social infrastructure cannot be taken for granted and extending this view to a model of rational voting means that improved trend growth will be rewarded at the ballot.
But are voters at all able to separate trend from cycle, when evaluating macroeconomic performance? On this question we identify two extreme views. The …rst, arguably implicit in the literature to date, is that all voters have no idea whatsoever what is trend and what is cycle, and cannot begin to disentangle the two. If this is the case, then empirical work should not identify distinct e¤ects. The second, is that all voters can perfectly decompose the trend and cycle. This is unlikely: at any point in time forecasters and commentators may di¤er substantially in their estimates of trend and cycle, and it is tempting to argue that if experts cannot agree then the lowly electorate must have no idea at all. The signals by which the electorate glean information concerning incumbent competency will therefore not literally take the form of exact measures of contemporaneous trend and cycle.
The truth is likely to be in between. In reality there is considerable heterogeneity in voters'knowledge sets. Prior (2005) documents a wide degree of political knowledge across the population. Voters who are interested in politics listen to political argument over the economy, and this includes arguments that a government is only achieving growth by stoking up an unsustainable boom, perhaps inducing unnecessary and visible in ‡ation; or that the in ‡ation rate has been brought down only by throwing people out of work. If voters can imperfectly perceive such cyclical movements, they must also be able to perceive, imperfectly, the trend around which it revolves. Conover et al (1986) and Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2009) both found that voters can estimate the unemployment rate quite accurately. Given that the unemployment rate is highly correlated with the business cycle it follows that voters have a reasonable idea of the business cycle as well.
In this paper heterogeneous political knowledge is modeled, in the simplest possible way, by having two types of voters: sophisticated and naive. The sophisticates are able to decompose output into trend and cycle. They like trend growth for the standard material reasons, whilst they dislike unnecessary volatility around that trend. On the other hand naive voters have standard preferences and are only interested in raw output levels at the time of the election. The …rst upshot of this reasoning is that trend growth should be rewarded at the ballot -sophisticated voters like it for its own sake, and given that raw growth is increasing in trend growth, naive voters also respond positively. The more interesting hypotheses relate to the cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Therefore there is ambiguity concerning whether cyclical upticks will increase the vote. On the other hand downswings are punished by both sets of voters. The naive dislike lower output levels, and the sophisticated dislike the volatility. There is no ambiguity here, downswings should have a strong negative e¤ect on the incumbent voter. We therefore posit an asymmetric vote response to the economic cycle.
Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the cyclical asymmetry hypothesis proposed in this paper. Using the large data set of elections provided by Hellwig and Samuels (2007) we …nd that trend growth positively impacts the incumbent vote share as anticipated, and that the impact of the cycle is indeed asymmetric. The results are consistent with a reasonable degree of 'sophistication'in the electorate because the vote response to positive values in the cycle is slightly negative (though the magnitude of this estimated e¤ect is small and is statistically insigni…cant.) A one standard deviation 'boom'is estimated to result in a vote loss to the incumbent of 0.71%. However, the vote response to negative values in the cycle is strongly negative and statistically signi…cant. A one standard deviation downswing in the cycle is estimated to result to a vote loss of 3.56%.
The idea that voters respond asymmetrically to the economy as a whole is not new. On the empirical question of whether of not the vote responds asymmetrically to raw measures of economic performance, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (forthcoming) …nd that the literature is mixed. The standard theoretical rationale for asymmetry is the 'grievance asymmetry' (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997) . This can arise …rstly from asymmetry in the social welfare function -losses are argued to be felt more acutely than gains in terms of utility di¤erences.
Alternatively, the salience of the economy may be increased in economic bad times, as the news media devote more air time to the economy.
In order to test the standard grievance asymmetry against our own model, which does not rely on asymmetric preferences or media penetration, we split the sample depending on whether trend growth is higher or lower than the median. The point of doing this is that downswings in the cycle when trend growth is high imply a less detrimental economic outcome in absolute terms. The cyclical downswing is o¤set by the high trend growth. In contrast cyclical downswings that occur when trend growth is low by construction means adverse economic circumstances in the aggregate. The standard grievance asymmetry predicts a stronger response to cyclical downswings when trend growth is low, because in these circumstances absolute growth is especially low. In the empirical analysis we …nd no variation in the subsamples split by trend growth. Voters respond asymmetrically to the cycle, to the same extent when trend growth is high and when it is low. A government which produces a downturn on top of low trend growth is indeed more unpopular than one which produces an equal downturn on top of high trend growth, but the di¤erence is entirely attributable to the di¤erence on trend growth.
Theory
Mainstream macroeconomic theory decomposes GDP (y t , measured in logarithms at time t)
where _ y t is trend and e y t the cyclical component. The latter is also known as the 'output gap'
and by construction is centred on zero, with positive values denoting booms, and negative values denoting output below its potential trend. Note that e y t < 0 does not by itself technically imply a recession, which typically is de…ned as two consecutive quarters of negative absolute growth. If _ y t is increasing, then this can o¤set e y t < 0 to prevent a formal recession.
As discussed in the introduction the drivers of these two components are typically argued to be distinct -e.g. see Romer (2012) .
We suppose two types of voter. 5 Both are materially motivated, but the 'sophisticated' group are informed, recognizing the di¤erence between trend and cycle. These voters like trend growth, because on average it increases income levels. If some of the responsibility for current trend growth is attributed to the incumbent, then these voters will ceteris paribus vote for incumbents delivering strong trend growth.
One possible objection at this point is that trend growth is very slow moving, and cannot be contemporaneously changed by the government of the day. To counter this we make a 5 One could equally imagine a continuum of voters, di¤erentiated by their political knowledge.
number of observations. Firstly, in the empirical work we document considerable variation both within and across countries in measured trend growth and note that the measure of trend growth refers to the year of the election, so in most instances the incumbent will at least have been in power for some years prior to this date. Secondly even if policies enacted today take several years to actually result in stronger growth, the stronger future growth will itself increase measured trend growth today. The trend is empirically constructed as a smoothed average and so if output increases are manifest in the future, current trend output will re ‡ect this. Third, it seems plausible that politics matters. In most countries governments are important in providing the basis for (or indeed retarding of) investment and factor accumulation. For example it could be that Ronald Reagan was re-elected because of his tax-cutting and anti-in ‡ationary economic policy, whilst Bill Clinton was re-elected for supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement. Both of these speci…c examples conceivably improved the capacity of the economy in the future, and would thus have increased trend growth by the point of the relevant re-election date. Indeed one alternative (and by no means mutually exclusive) way of framing our argument is that 'on the ground'policies such as these are visible, interpreted and evaluated by the electorate. When evaluated overall as positive then these policies will translate into votes. If the assessment also is at least to some extent more predisposed to be correct than incorrect, then trend growth, measured ex post, can be understood as a proxy for good policy visible on the ground, at least to the sophisticated part of the electorate.
However, if responsibility for current trend growth is deemed to be low -for example voters attribute its position as due to exogenous processes alone, then the upshot of this would be that one would not expect sophisticated voters, as we have de…ned them, to respond to trend growth.
On the other hand, sophisticated voters dislike the volatility encapsulated in the economic cycle. Volatility may reduce utility if consumption cannot be smoothed over the cycle.
In the New Keynesian macroeconomic literature, both positive and negative output gaps engender price dispersion which change consumption patterns from their ideal, reducing utility. Alternatively excessive volatility may just increase uncertainty in the economy, which in turn could suppress investment. Sophisticated voters may thus punish 'arti…cial' preelectoral booms for unnecessarily increasing volatility in the economy. In di¤erent contexts they may also punish incumbents for failing to curtail excessive volatility when originating from exogenous processes. Again, as long as there is some responsibility for the cycle that is attributed to the incumbent, then these voters will ceteris paribus vote against incumbents associated with larger absolute cycles and hence greater volatility.
In contrast the 'naive'group are relatively uninformed. They respond only to raw GDP.
Regardless of whether or not the growth is induced by sustainable trend or unsustainable boom these voters reward immediate material gain. 6
Immediately this very simple set-up delivers interesting and novel hypotheses that have not to date been investigated.
Firstly trend growth should have an unambiguous positive impact on the vote. Sophisticated voters like trend growth as described, and given that at least some responsibility for improved trend growth is attributed to the incumbent, then strong trend growth increases the incumbent vote share. Furthermore given independence between _ y t and e y t , then naive 6 An alternative way of modeling the naive voters, leading to the same conclusions, would be to assume an in…nite discount rate. One problem which sophisticated voters have with a boom today (i.e. a positive value for e y t ) is that by construction it entails slower growth in the future. If this is discounted completely, then only y t (i.e. output today) determines the vote. voters will also respond positively, because higher _ y t implies higher y t . We therefore have hypothesis 1 (H1):
H1: The incumbent vote will be increasing (reducing) for higher (lower) values of trend growth.
More interestingly, the implications for the cycle are asymmetric. Positive values of the output gap (e y t > 0) are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. When e y t is positive, then raw output growth is increased, but the sophisticates recognize this as undesirable, and attribute some of the responsibility of this volatility to the incumbent. On the other hand negative values of the output gap are punished by both groups of voters. Sophisticates dislike volatility, and the naive dislike low growth. We therefore have hypotheses 2 (H2) and 3 (H3):
H2: The vote will respond positively to the output gap. H3: The vote will respond negatively to the absolute magnitude of the output gap.
H2 encapsulates 'naive' voting, and by itself predicts a straightforward linear response to the cycle. Upswings are rewarded and downswings are punished. H3 encapsulates 'sophisticated voting'. For sophisticates, any deviation from the trend is undesirable and if incumbents are partly held responsible for such deviations then they will lose votes. The implication of H2 and H3 is that the vote in aggregate will be asymmetric to the cyclical component of output. Theoretically there will be a stronger response to negative cyclical movement than to positive cyclical movement.
Empirical Evidence
Ideally we would have micropolitical data for perceived trend growth and cycles, but to the best of our knowledge these do not exist. The approach taken here is to use standard decomposition procedures, and make the assumption that the generated data are representative of the electorate's actual perceptions. It seems likely to us that some voters at least will have a sense of when growth is below its potential, and whether abnormally high growth is sustainable or not, for example indirectly through observation of other macroeconomic data such as in ‡ation and unemployment. The data generated from the standard decomposition will at least be correlated with these perceptions, given the assumption that on average at least they are correct.
The starting point for the empirical analysis is Hellwig and Samuels (2007) with decomposing time-series into trend and cyclical elements is avoided. In order to obtain measures for economic trend and cycle these data were transformed into natural logarithms and then decomposed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter. 8 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the data used in this study, and shows that average trend growth,g _ y , in the year of the election, is about 1.8% with meaningful dispersion around this. 9 In a panel regression of g _ y on country …xed e¤ects and annual time e¤ects the adjusted R 2 is 0.37 -showing considerable unexplained variation both within and between countries. Trend growth is of course correlated with conventional raw economic growth (de…ned as g y ), but Figure 1 below demonstrates that there is sizeable variation between the trend and raw growth measures.
The R-square in a bivariate regression is equal to 0.59, hence there is also meaningful cyclical variation in the raw data as would be expected. e y denotes the HP cyclical component of GDP, and has similar dispersion to g _ y . The average position in the cycle at the time of election is small but positive (less than 20% of one standard deviation).
The benchmark for the empirical analysis is Model 1 in Hellwig and Samuels (2007) . In their speci…cation the dependent variable is the incumbent vote share, and the key explanatory variable is raw growth (in Hellwig and Samuels (2007) this variable is called 'Economy').
We replicate their Model 1 in column 1 of table 2, but using the newly collected GDP per 8 There is a considerable econometric literature examining alternative means of decomposing time-series data into trend and cycle, and alternatives to the HP …lter exist. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank the HP …lter is the most common method used to this end in applied macroeconomic research.
Alternatives such as the Baxter-King (1999) band-pass …lter di¤er substantially only at the end-points of the data. Because the election dates all fall well within the time period for which we have GDP data there are no substantive di¤erences between the cycle estimates of the alternative …lters. Using the Baxter-King …lter does not change any of the results reported here in any important way. 9 Following Hellwig and Samuels (2007) we used data from the year preceding the election if the election was held in the …rst 6 months of the year, and data from the year of the election itself if the election was held in the second half of the year. capita data. The results con…rm the original …ndings. 10 Raw growth has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the incumbent vote share.
In column 2 the raw growth data are decomposed separately into trend and cycle. This speci…cation presupposes symmetry in response to the cycle, but is of interest as a preliminary examination of the question of whether or not the trend and cycle a¤ect the vote di¤erently.
As noted above if all voters are naive, and only raw output matters, then the two elements should have equal e¤ects on the vote. The results show that the impact of the trend is estimated to be positive and statistically signi…cant, with an estimated coe¢ cient quite close to that estimated for raw growth. In contrast, the coe¢ cient estimate corresponding to the cycle is about half that of the trend and is not statistically signi…cant. The takeaway here would be that the trend is important, whilst the cycle isn't, though of course this speci…cation ignores the potential asymmetry in the vote response to the cycle.
When the absolute value of the cycle is included as an additional explanatory variable, in accordance with hypothesis 3 (in column 3 of table 2) the results change as follows. The impact of trend growth is still positive, though is now only signi…cant at the 10% level. More interestingly the impact of the cycle is entirely consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3 above.
The coe¢ cient estimate on e y is now positive and signi…cant at the 5% level. In contrast the coe¢ cient on the absolute value of the cycle, Abs je yj, is negative and signi…cant with a p-value of 1.1%. Thus the positive electoral response induced by positive values for e y are cancelled out by Abs je yj. In contrast the negative electoral response induced by negative values for e y are augmented by Abs je yj. This provides strong support for the asymmetry hypothesis advanced above. Because the coe¢ cient estimate for Abs je yj is greater in absolute terms than that for e y, even positive ‡uctuations in the cycle are estimated to be detrimental to votes. 11 Using these parameter estimates a one standard deviation 'boom' (e y = 1:888) is estimated to result in a vote loss to the incumbent of 0.71%. However a one standard deviation 'growth recession' (e y = 1:888) is estimated to result to a vote loss of 3.56%.
Output ‡uctuations are to be avoided -but most especially negative values.
Our interpretation of these …nding is that the electorate are heterogenous in their knowledge of the economy. A meaningful portion have some degree of sophistication, and dislike output gaps of any sort. Another sizable part of the electorate doesn't recognize the economic cycle, but is nonetheless motivated by raw GDP. These voters reward upswings and punish downswings. There is no evidence at all for an electoral reward to a cyclical boom.
There is considerable evidence that voters punish negative values of the cycle.
The standard rationale given for possible asymmetry in the economic vote is the 'grievance asymmetry'. This argument applies to the economy as measured in raw terms. Voters are more aggrieved in recessions than in booms. The mechanism could be issue saliency -as 'bad news'is reported to a fuller extent than 'good news', or it could straightforwardly be asymmetry in the welfare function. In order to test this explanation against ours, we split the sample in two, depending on whether trend growth is above or below its median value of 1.8%. The point here is that when trend growth is low, then negative values for e y will to a greater extent imply recession, which is de…ned in terms of negative growth in actual 11 If e y + and e y respectively denote positive and negative values of e y, which is positive for a fraction w of the time, then the …nding that dV dje yj (where V is the vote) is negative and larger in magnitude than dV de y implies that:
Given that je y + j = e y + and je y j = e y it therefore follows that dV de y + < 0.
(raw) output. When trend growth is high, then this will cancel out negative values for e y in the aggregate, and voters will be less aggrieved. If the grievance asymmetry is correct, then we would expect to see that the economy, especially Abs je yj would be a stronger (negative) determinant of the vote when trend growth is low. If instead voters divide into naive and sophisticated, with only the latter disliking volatility, then we would expect to see no change in the impact of Abs je yj on the incumbent vote share. 12
Columns (4) and (5) (4) and (5) are not statistically signi…cant.
The …nding that the asymmetric electoral response to the economic cycle is essentially independent of the prevailing level of trend growth sits awkwardly with the grievance asymmetry. It is hard to imagine that voters will be equally aggrieved when the cycle is 2% below trend growth of 4% than when it is 2% below 0%. However, this …nding is quite consistent with the argument proposed here, that voters are heterogenous, and di¤erentially respond to the economic cycle.
Conclusion
This paper examines how decomposed GDP data a¤ect the incumbent vote share in general elections. Following mainstream macroeconomic theory trend growth and the cycle are argued to have di¤erent drivers, and a¤ect voter welfare di¤erently. Voters are modeled to be heterogenous in their knowledge of the state of the economy. The sophisticated separately observe both, whilst the naive only observe raw growth -the aggregate of the two. The sophisticated like trend growth, but dislike the volatility associated with any deviation from trend -be it positive or negative. The naive just plainly like raw growth. This very simple set up generates an asymmetry hypothesis. The incumbent vote share should respond more strongly to cyclical downswings than it should to upswings. In the former case the sophisticated and the naive are aligned in their disapprobation, whilst in the latter they are con ‡icted.
Using an established and inclusive data set we …nd strong evidence in favor of an asymmetric vote response to the economic cycle. Upswings yield nothing, at least in terms of statistical signi…cance. Downswings are signi…cantly punished at the ballot. This relationship holds equally at high levels of trend growth and low, in contrast to more familiar conceptions of the 'grievance asymmetry'. Table 1 : V ote is the total incumbent vote share. g y is raw economic growth in the year of the election (or the preceding year if the election takes place in the …rst half of the year).
g _ y denotes trend growth, and e y denotes the HP cyclical component of GDP.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
V ote t 1 0:477 Estimation follows Hellwig and Samuels (2007) . Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered within countries in parentheses. The control variables (results not reported) include trade openness and its interaction with economic growth, a dummy variable denoting Presidential elections and its interaction with economic growth, a re-election dummy for elections where incumbents were running in Presidential or semipresidential elections, the e¤ective number of parties, GDP per capita in constant US dollars, and geographic dummy variables for Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. denotes signi…cance at the 1% level, denotes signi…cance at the 5% level and denotes signi…cance at the 10% level.
